Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 39

Issue 2

Article 3

October 1962

Admission by Silence of Written Matter: A Comment on Evidence
and Public Policy
G. Thomas Cestaro

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
G. T. Cestaro, Admission by Silence of Written Matter: A Comment on Evidence and Public Policy, 39 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 138 (1962).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol39/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

ADMISSION BY SILENCE OF WRITTEN MATTER:
A COMMENT ON EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY
G.

THOMAS CESTARO*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Hicksville Daily Bugle, July 32, 1962
"LIKES REDS," SCHMALTZ SAYS
Joe Schmaltz, well known Hicksville left-winger, last night
told a meeting of the Hicksville Junior College Political Science
Club that communism would be good for the United States.
"We need another Castro in the White House," Schmaltz replied to a question from the floor. "Communism could cure a
lot of our headaches," he added.
64 Crazy Lane
Upper Slabodia, Illinois
Dear Mr. Glurg:
I have repeatedly noticed you slipping into the Majestic

Theatre without purchasing a ticket. Unless you write me by
return mail and tell me that you will stop doing this, I shall be
compelled to report you to the manager. A man of your age
should be ashamed of himself.
Very truly yours,
Ebenezer Spy
The problem of admission by silence of written matter falls
into one of two broad categories. The first constitutes the failure
to deny or take other action to correct or redress false statements
about or statements incorrectly attributed to an individual and
coming to his attention only incidentally. The most common
example is a newspaper or magazine story, radio or television
broadcast, or letter to the editor of a periodical not written by the
purported author. The fictitious article above illustrates this.
The other example, more frequently found in the cases, is the
failure to reply to a letter specifically directed to the individual
who is sought to be charged with the admission. The fictitious
letter set forth above is an example of this.
0 B.B.A. 1948, St. John's University, LL.B. 1951, New York Law School. Member
of the New York Bar.
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Of course, there are a number of special exceptions with
which we are not now concerned. For example, where parties are
engaged in mutual commercial transactions, and a statement of
account is rendered and not disputed, the rule is that such a statement is admissible as an admission.' Likewise, other commercial
transactions between the parties, or even a course of mutual correspondence, may give rise to a duty to dispute an incorrect statement, and hence a failure to do so might constitute an admission.2
A written statement shown to a party and not answered by him
orally on the spot, may have the effect of an oral admission, which
is, of course, admissible.3 And finally, action taken on the basis of
a written communication may constitute an admission of the material therein. In each of these cases, there is something more than
the mere passive failure to answer the charge.
This article is concerned with the bare case where a party
receives letters or reads articles appearing in newspapers or periodicals concerning him and omits to do anything at all. In such cases,
should the mere omission to take any action to deny or rebut such
material serve as an admission of the truth of it?
II.

RECEIPT OF COMMUNICATION

In order to lay the foundation for an admission by silence of
written material, it is, of course, first necessary to prove that the
party sought to be charged with the admission has actually read
and understood the charge made in it.5 In the case of newspaper
stories, actual reading must be directly proven. One could hardly
raise a presumption of the reading of a newspaper story merely because the newspaper was sold in the community in which he lived.
Even purchase of the newspaper involved would be insufficient to
create the presumption, since a newspaper has many stories, and it
is entirely possible that only some of them were read. It would be
going entirely too far to require a party to read every line in any
periodical to be purchased at the risk of being concluded by evidence that he had purchased the newspaper or periodical and that
1 2 Wigmore on Evidence (2d Ed.), § 1073(3).
See 31 C.J.S., Evidence, § 297.
3 2 Wigmore on Evidence (2d Ed.) § 1073(1).
4 Id. § 1073(4).
5 Cf. Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Metc.) 235, 237 (1847).

2
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somewhere in its pages it contained something pertaining to him
which he did not protest.0
Knowledge of the contents of a letter, however, may be presumed where the letter is personalized and received by the party to
whom it is addressed.7 Most people read their mail, and accordingly, actual receipt of a letter should raise an inference of knowledge of the contents.
In charging a person with knowledge of the contents of a
letter, proof of mailing with proper postage and a proper address
is necessary to raise the presumption that the letter was received.'
The contest as to proof of facts necessary to raise the presumption
usually revolves around whether the correct address was used,
since most people are acquainted with ordinary postage rates and
the need to drop the letter in a mail box.
The Illinois rule is that "the placing in the mail of an envelope properly stamped, is not even presumptive evidence of the
receipt of the same, unless the same was properly addressed." 9 This
rule is in accord with the great weight of authority, 10 not only in
the state courts, whose rules of evidence are sometimes not too
Cf. 31 C.J.S., Evidence, § 150c.
Ibid.
8 31 C.J.S., Evidence, § 136.
9 Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Frommhold, 75 Ill. App. 43, 54 (1897).
10 31 C.J.S., Evidence, § 136b.
11 Denson v. Kirkpatrick Drilling Co., 225 Ala. 473, 144 So. 86, 92 (1932) ("To
raise a presumption of delivery of a letter to a particular person, it is not enough to
show that it was mailed to him, but it must be shown that the envelope was properly
addressed to the person at his place of business or residence, stamped, and posted');
Ninth District v. Wofford Power Co., 37 Ga. App. 271, 139 S.E. 916, 917 (1927) ("Evidence that a letter was mailed to a named person does not raise a presumption that he
received it, unless there is also evidence that the letter was properly addressed and
duly stamped. The court erred in admitting . . . testimony . . . as to mailing . . . it
not appearing that they were mailed in letters properly addressed and duly stamped");
Breedlove v. General Baking Co., 138 Kans. 143, 23 P.2d 482, 483 (1933) ("The entire
absence of evidence as to its being properly addressed deprives it of the presumption
of delivery"); Brown v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 241 Ky. 514, 44 S.W.2d 514, 516
(1931) ("In the absence of evidence showing it was properly addressed, stamped and
mailed, there is no presumption that it was received by the addressee'); Miller v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Mo. App., 1941) ("The rule which
prevails generally, and as we read the cases which prevails in our State, is set forth in
22 C.J. 98 § 39 as follows: 'Receipt of a letter by the person for whom it was intended
cannot be presumed unless it is proved that the letter was properly addressed to him,
at the city or town where he resides or has his place of business, with the street and
number if it is a city of considerable size"); Fountain City Drill Co. v. Lindquist, 22
S.D. 7, 114 N.W. 1098, 1100 (1908) (without correct address, there is no presumption
of receipt of mail); Crow v. Thompson, 131 S.W.2d 1064, 1069 (Tex. Civ. App., 1939)
("The mailing of the notice to the wrong address does not raise any presumption that it
6
7
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liberal," but in the federal courts as well, both before the Federal
3
Rules of Civil Procedure 12 as well as after its adoption.'

The reason for the rule requiring a showing of a correct address where a letter is sent to a city of any size is that unless the
name is very unusual, there will probably be more than one person
of that name residing in the city, and without the right address the
letter may be delivered to the wrong individual. This possibility
precludes the presumption because it is not more likely than otherwise that the letter was delivered to the person intended if the address was wrong or omitted. As the leading case of Lansburgh v.
M. P. Howlett Fish & Oyster Co.' 4 held:
But the general statement of the witness that he mailed
the bill in an envelope addressed to the defendant at
Baltimore, Md. was hardly sufficient proof of a proper
mailing to raise a presumption that the bill reached its
destination. .

.

. Receipt of a letter by the person for

whom it was intended cannot be presumed unless it is
proved that the letter was properly addressed to him, at
the city or town where he resides or has his place of business, with the street and number if it is a city of considerwas received"); Thompson v. Kleinman, 259 S.W. 593, 598 (rex. Civ. App., 1924) ("The
presumption [of receipt of letters] . . . does not arise in any case unless it appears
that the matter was properly directed to the post office address of the addressee');
Treyevant & Cochran v. R. H. Powell & Co., 61 Tex. Civ. App. 449, 130 S.W. 234,
236 (1910) ("The rule is that a letter will not be presumed to have been received
by the addressee, unless it is shown that it was deposited in the post office properly
addressed and stamped'); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 9 Utah
2d 215, 341 P.2d 944, 946-7 (1959) ("There is, of course, no presumption that a letter,
even though mailed in regular course, was received by her when it was not addressed
where she was living"); Sinnott v. Sinnott, 27 Wash. 2d 520, 179 P.2d 305 (1947);
Spokane Valley State Bank v. Murphy, 150 Wash. 640, 274 Pac. 702 (1929) (no presumption that letter mailed to the wrong address was delivered).
12 Henderson v. Carbondale Coal & Coke Co., 140 U.S. 25, 36-7 (1890) (unless
letters are correctly addressed, mailing is not "evidence, tending, if credited by the
jury, to show the receipt of such letters').
13 Flowers v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 163 F.2d 411, 416 (6th Cir., 1947) ("The
usual presumption that a letter properly stamped, addressed and mailed is delivered
in due course would not prevail in this case, as the record does not show any address
to which the notice was mailed"); Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Cox, 104 F.2d 321, 325
(6th Cir., 1939) ("Before there arises a presumption of fact that the addressee of a
letter has received it, it must first be proved that it was properly addressed, but no
such presumption arises unless it appears that the person to whom sent resided at the
place to which mailed'); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Reaux, 59 F. Supp. 969, 972 (N.D.
Ohio, 1945) ("Unless a letter is correctly addressed to the street, number and city in
which the addressee lives, the usual presumption that it was received will not be entertained').
14 153 Md. 312, 138 Atl. 269 (1927).
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able size, . . . we have not the requisite information as to

the course of correspondence between the parties to enable us to determine that a letter directed to the defendant
in so large a city as Baltimore, without the designation of
the street and number of his place of business, or residence, was sufficiently addressed to raise the presumption
of its receipt for the purposes of secondary proof of its
contents.' 5
Likewise, Selken v. Northland Insurance Co.16 holds:

In order to raise a presumption of delivery of a paper
through the mail, .

.

. (3) there must be evidence of the

correct post office address of the person to be charged
with receiving it; (4) evidence that the package contain7
ing the document was properly addressed.'
It also held:
As a general statement 31 C.J.S., [Evidence S. 136(b)]
states: "Receipt of mail matter by the person for whom it
was intended cannot be presumed unless it is proved that
the matter was properly addressed to him, at the city or
town where he resides or has his place of business, with
this street and number if it is a city of considerable size,
or at the post office where he usually receives his mail."'"
The rule that a correct address must be shown to raise a presumption of delivery to the addressee intended has even been extended to include the zone number. One federal case held as
follows:
The deficiency notice was mailed. .

.

. It was not

properly addressed, in that the wrong zone number in
Washington was included in the address. .

.

.Since the

address was not proper, there is no presumption that it
was delivered in the ordinary course of the mails. 19
15

Id. at 271.

18 249 Iowa 1046, 90 N.W.2d 29 (1958).
17
18
19

Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
Kiker v. C.I.R., 218 F.2d 389, 392 (4th Cir., 1955).
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This rule is very important in admission-by-silence in letter
cases. The requirement of testimony as to a correct address must
be positive and unequivocal. Mere conjecture, belief, or practice
20
to correctly address letters is not enough.
Moreover, the rule that letters must be correctly addressed
if a presumption of receipt is to be raised applies to cities of any
size. One case applied the rule to a city of only 6,000 people. 2 ' In
the early days of the United States, most people lived on farms or
in rural areas where the town postmaster knew them all. Today,
with ever-increasing urbanization of the population, and with
anonymous cities and suburbs growing apace, the rule requiring a
correct address even to raise the presumption of receipt of a letter
covers most of the population.
If the party sought to be charged with the admission admits
receipt of the letter, then no problem of presumption need arise.
However, if as often happens, he denies having received the letter,
then his testimony must be weighed against the presumption which
arises from proof of due mailing. In such a case reliance on the
bare presumption of receipt is tenuous at best, since evidence of
non-receipt tends to overthrow the presumption. 22 Thus, in Hult
v. Interstate Savings & Loan Assn., 23 it was held:
From the mailing of the letter to the defendant, but a
prima facie presumption that it was received in due
course of mail arose; and, when the defendant testifies in
express terms that it was not received, this presumption
was entirely negatived; not because such testimony was in
conflict with that of the plaintiff, but because it overcame
a presumption flowing from the acts proved. A letter
mailed to a person does not necessarily reach him, and
while, for convenience sake, and from the necessity of
Palmer-Murphy Co. v. Rawlings, 35 Ga. App. 196, 132 S.E. 646 (1926).
Stiegler v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 146 Md. 629, 127 Ati. 397, 404 (1925).
22 Cassel v. Randall, 10 Ga. App. 587, 93 S.E. 858 (1912), holding that the rebuttable presumption of receipt of mail properly addressed, stamped and mailed is
entirely overcome by the uncontradicted evidence that the letter was never received.
See, however, Kingsland Land Co. v. Newman, 1 App. Div. 1, 36 N.Y.S. 960 (1896):
"The fact that the notice had not been received by the appellant, though it would
have been of very little weight against the positive testimony of a disinterested person
that it had been deposited in the post office, was yet a circumstance which, in this
case, the appellant was entitled to have the jury consider."
23 15 Wash. 627, 47 Pac. 13 (1896).
20
21
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business, its reception will be presumed, this presumption, flowing from the fact that letters usually reach their
destination, can have little weight, as against positive
testimony to the effect that the letter was never received.24
Likewise, in Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Martin25 the
Supreme Court of Arkansas declared:
But the presumption ceases to exist where the addressee
denies receiving the letter. In that case it becomes question of fact whether the letter was received.
The Court does not care to indulge in speculation
or conjecture, as to what occurred to the letter, but it is
not impossible nor improbable that the letter, when
mailed in Fort Smith, before transmission in due course,
might have been lost or misplaced. The court prefers,
however, to predicate its finding upon the evidence in
the record.26
Moreover, not only does testimony that a letter was not received rebut the presumption of receipt through proof of proper
mailing and addressing, but "there also arises a presumption that
the letter was not mailed where the addressee testifies that such
letter was not delivered and that he did not receive it." '2 7 The
Id. at 15.
229 Ark. 1065, 320 S.W.2d 266 (1959).
Id. at 268. To the same effect see Campbell v. Snyder, 287 Ky. 596, 154 S.W.2d
724, 727 (1941), where the court declared: "Appellant . . . said he wrote appellee a
letter notifying him to return to the work and finish it. Appellee denied having received the letter and since there is no evidence that he did receive it, except the mailing
of it which merely raised a presumption that he received it, which presumption was
completely overcome by appellee's positive evidence that he did not receive it."
27 Hobson v. Security State Bank, 56 Idaho 601, 57 P.2d 685, 688 (1936). This rule
is also supported by Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Maes, 235 F.2d 918, 921
(10th Cir., 1956) ("The law does presume where there is evidence that a notice of this
kind wasn't received, a legal presumption arises that it wasn't properly mailed and
addressed .... non-receipt raises a presumption that it wasn't properly mailed'); Jenson
v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 141 Cal. App. 2d 162, 296 P.2d 434, 436 (1956) ("If proof
that a properly addressed and stamped letter was posted gives rise to a presumption
that it was received in due course, so proof that no letter was received warrants a
finding that it was never posted. If this plaintiff's testimony denying the receipt of the
letter was believed, the jury would be warranted in going further and finding that the
letter was not posted-[citing many cases]"); Matlock v. Citizens' Nat. Bank of Salmon,
43 Idaho 214, 250 Pac. 648, 649 (1926) ("However, when the failure of such a letter to
arrive has been established, there conversely arises the presumption that it was never
mailed'); Burkitt v. Broyles, 317 S.W.2d 762, 767-8 (rex. Civ. App., 1958) ("presump24
25
26
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rationale for this rule is set forth in Wilson v. Frankfort Marine,
Acc. & Plate Glass Ins. Co. 28 as follows:
The presumption arising from the known regularity of
the United States mail service is as available for the supposed receiver of a letter as for the alleged sender thereof.
If proof that a properly addressed and stamped letter was
posted gives rise to a presumption that it was received in
due course, so proof that no letter was received warrants
a finding that it was never posted. If this plaintiff's testimony denying the receipt of the letter was believed, the
jury would be warranted in going further and finding
that the letter was not posted.2
The foregoing cases illustrate how tenuous is proof of receipt
of a letter, or even proof of mailing to a correct address, although
this is testified to by the sender, when the addressee positively
testifies that the letter was not received. When, however, the sender
is unable to testify to the address to which the letter was sent, no
presumption of receipt, and hence admission by failure to answer,
can be indulged in, and evidence of the contents of the letter
would be inadmissible. Even, however, where the letter is received,
the weight of authority is against admission.

III.

FAILURE TO RESPOND TO LETTERS: THE STATE COURT RULE

The question of whether the Illinois Supreme Court would
admit a letter into evidence because the recipient, who is sought
to be charged with the admission, had failed to respond to it, and
deny the charges contained in the letter, has never been finally
disposed of by that court. The only expression from that court on
the subject was in Hoef v. Hoef,30 where it was held: "Where
verbal communications are made, silence may authorize an inference of assent, but the same rule does not ordinarily apply to letters
tion of the failure to mail arising from non-delivery'); Border State Life Ins. Co. v.
Noble, 138 S.W.2d 119, 122 (rex. Civ. App., 1946) ("If delivery may be presumed from
mailing, the failure to mail may be inferred from non-delivery. This proposition is
valid where the mailing, stamping and addressing is an issuable fact. . . . As supporting the proposition the failure to mail may be inferred from failure to receive, the
cases next cited are almost parallel as to their facts to the case at bar [cases]').
28 77 N.H. 344, 91 Atl. 913 (1914).
29 Id. at 914.
80 323 Ill. 170, 153 N.E. 658 (1926).
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received but never answered and in no way acted upon."81 This
declaration is, of course, ambiguous. By saying that the rule does
not "ordinarily" apply, the court has left open the possibility of
a future holding that the same rule of admission by silence might
sometimes apply if the situation was not "ordinary." Thus, to
determine what the Illinois Supreme Court would decide, it is
necessary to examine the rule from other states.
The Alabama Supreme Court has recently declared that "The
general rule is that self-serving declarations in a letter which was
not answered cannot be treated as admitted because the letter was
not answered. The rule is different from that which obtains in
respect to a claim verbally made to another in person."32 Likewise,
a decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas holds that statements
by one person brought to the attention of another are not made
admissible against the latter by his silence.83 A decision of the
California District Court of Appeals looks the same way. 4
The same rule against admission by silence of written matter
is in force in Colorado, according to its Court of Appeals, 8 in
Connecticut, 6 and in Delaware. The Florida Supreme Court
has held in Sullivan v. McMillan, as follows:
31 Id. at 659. See, however, Bradley v. Hubbard, 209 Ill. App. 236 (1917), holding
that the mere fact that a letter received is not answered is not evidence of acquiescence
by the party receiving it in the facts stated therein.
82 Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Beeland Bros., 242 Ala. 591, 7 So. 2d 265, 267 (1942).
See also Millsap v. Wolfe, 1 Ala. App. 599, 56 So. 22 (1911). In that case, an action
for the price of a horse defended on the ground of breach of warranty, the testimony
of the agent of the seller making the sale, that the buyer after the death of the horse
did not claim that the agent on behalf of the seller had warranted the horse to be
sound, was held to be properly excluded. The appellate court declared at p. 25: "This
testimony was not offered to contradict any statement made by the defendant while he
was on the witness stand, as a witness. It would have, if allowed, thrown no light on
the questions involved in the case and was properly excluded."
33 Toney v. Raines, 224 Ark. 692, 275 S.W.2d 771 (1955).
84 Macmillan Pet. Corp. v. Griffin, 116 Cal. App. 2d 425, 255 P.2d 75, 78 (1958)
where the court said: "We do not see that such failure to deny amounted to an admission [of facts in an affidavit] by Jovick. We are dealing with evidence to prove facts,
not with pleadings to frame issues. Jovick's mere failure to testify on the subject added
nothing to the weight of Mr. Hatch's statement."
385 Lee-Clark-Andreesen Hardware Co. v. Yankee, 9 Colo. App. 443, 48 Pac. 1050,
1051 (1897) ("The fact that defendant had received such a letter from Mr. Judd, and
failed to reply to it, could not have bound defendant in any manner'),
36 Weller v. Fish Transport Co., 123 Conn. 49, 192 Atl. 317 (1937), holding that
evidence that a party failed to object to a written statement at a coroner's inquest was
not admissible.
37 Wilmington Trust Co. v. General Motors Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 572, 51 A.2d 584,
592 (1947), holding that the failure of alleged donees of stock to deny statements made
by alleged donor in his letters to them that he would dispose of stock in any way that
he cared to, did not amount to an admission by silence that alleged donor was owner
of the stock.
38 26 Fla. 543, 8 So. 450 (1890).
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The authorities all hold that the acquiescence inferrable
from silence when words are spoken to a person's face
cannot be inferred from silence as to a written communication. What is said to a man before his face he is in
some degree called upon to contradict, if he does not acquiesce in it, but not answering a letter is quite different,
and it is too much to say that a man, by omitting to answer a letter, at all events admits the truth of the statements that letter contains. .

.

. Letters addressed to a

person, and found, unanswered, in his possession, are,
upon this principle, held not to be admissible against him
as evidence of the statements made in them.39
There is no admission by silence of written matter in Georgia or in Iowa.4 1 Likewise, an old pre-Civil War case lays down
the same rule in Louisiana.4 2 And a quite recent case from the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine looks the same way.43
40

There are several Maryland cases rejecting the admission-bysilence rule in respect to written matter. 44 In one of them, the Court
of Appeals said:
39 Id. at 461.
40 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Nix, 73 Ga. App. 184, 36 S.E.2d 111, 116 (1945)

("a
failure to reply to statements made in a letter, which is not a part of a mutual correspondence, is not considered an implied admission by the addressee of the truth of
the statements').
41 Seevers v. Cleveland Coal Co., 158 Iowa 574, 138 N.W. 793, 801 (1912) ("The
mere fact that letters were received and remain unanswered has no tendency to show
an acquiescence of the party in the facts stated in them. A party is not to be driven
into a correspondence of that character to protect himself from such consequences."
[citing many cases]).
42 Porter v. A. Ledonx & Co., 6 La. Ann. 377, 379 (1851) ("it seems to us to be
going too far to say that the plaintiff, by not answering this letter, is to be considered
as admitting the truth of their declarations').
43 Lyle v. Bangor & A. R. Co., 150 Me. 327, 110 A.2d 584 (1954), holding that a
defendant did not admit liability for injuries sustained by employee merely because an
investigator employed by defendant, in the discussion of case with employee's attorney,
did not specifically deny liability, liability was not denied in correspondence between
attorneys for the employee and the defendant, and the defendant voluntarily and
without solicitation paid the hospital bill and medical expenses incurred by the employee.
44 See Hieatzman v. Braecklein, 131 Md. 482, 102 Atl. 917, 919 (1919).
In this
suit, to cancel corporate stock transferred to defendant pursuant to an agreement with
complainant, to whom a large amount of stock was issued, evidence that complainant
in a conversation with witness did not assert any claim to the stock transferred to
defendant was held of no weight in showing that complainant had no valid claim.
And see also Katzel v. Clark, 215 Md. 54, 137 A.2d 125, 129 (1957) where it was held
that evidence of the failure of the defendants to file suits against the plaintiffs was
properly excluded.
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But it is clear, both on principle and authority, that we
have no right to indulge in the assumption that the letters above referred to had the force and effect of verbal
statements made in the presence of the defendant's officers. The rule is precisely to the contrary: [Quotes at
length from Learned v. Tillotson, 97 N.Y. 12 that:] a distinction exists between . . .oral declarations . . .and a

written statement in a letter.4 5
The rule against admission of unanswered letters as evidence
of the truth of the matter stated therein on the theory that by failing to reply the party receiving the letter admits the truth of what
is said therein was accepted in Massachusetts a full century ago.46
This exclusionary rule is supported by over a half dozen decisions
squarely on point.47 The strength of the exclusionary rule is illus-

trated by one recent case where a letter written by a third party to
the seller of stock contained certain statements relative to the
third party's association with a buyer and the corporation in which
both the seller and buyer were originally stockholders, and where
the buyer saw a copy of the letter while conferring with the third
party and did not deny the statements. The court held that since
the statements were not directed to the buyer, his failure to deny
them did not render the letter admissible in a later suit between
the seller and the buyer on the ground that the letter contained
admissions. 48 Here, the situation virtually approaches an oral admission-by-silence situation, for the reply of a spontaneous oral
denial can be expected. Nevertheless, so strong is the rule against
admission of written matter not affirmatively adopted, that the
letter was excluded.
Briggs v. Stueler, 93 Md. 100, 48 Atl. 727, 729 (1901).
46 Dearing v. Kimball, 86 Mass. (4 Allen) 125, 128 (1862) ("the omission to answer
letters written to a party by a third person does not show an acquiescence in the facts
there stated, as might be authorized to be inferred in the case of silence where verbal
statements were made directly to him").
47 Sargent v. Lord, 232 Mass. 585, 122 N.E. 761, 762 (1919) ("If defendant failed to
answer the letter, his failure would not make the letter admissible'); Arcade Malleable
Iron Co. v. Jenks, 229 Mass. 95, 118 N.E. 288, 289-290 (1918); Smith v. Abbott, 221
Mass. 326, 109 N.E. 190, 192 (1915); Pye v. Perry, 217 Mass. 68, 104 N.E. 460, 462 (1914);
Jennings v. Wall, 217 Mass. 278, 104 N.E. 738 (1914); Callahan v. Goldman, 216 Mass.
234, 103 N.E. 687, 688 (1913). Cf. Phillips v. Vorenberg, 259 Mass. 46, 156 N.E. 61, 64
(1927) excluding evidence that no demand for payment was made.
48 Mendelsohn v. Leather Mfg. Corp., 326 Mass. 226, 93 N.E.2d 537, 544 (1950).
45
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The rationale behind the Massachusetts rule is best expressed
in Kumin v. Fine49 as follows:

The rule is well established that a person to whom a
letter is addressed ordinarily is not required to make any
reply; and failure to answer it is no evidence of the truth
of the facts therein stated, because such evidence would
be in violation of the rule that a party cannot make evidence for himself by his own declarations. It was held in
Wiedeman v. Walpole [1891] 2 Q.B. 534, that in an action for breach of promise of marriage the mere fact that
the defendant did not answer letters written to him by
the plaintiff in which she stated that he promised to
marry her, was not corroborative of the plaintiff's testimony in support of such promise.50
The Michigan rule that "omission to answer a letter pending
a controversy cannot be held an admission of the adverse party's
claims"'" is likewise well settled. 52 In State Bank of St. Johns v.
McCabe,3 the Supreme Court of Michigan declared:
The authorities make a distinction between statements
made orally and those contained in letters which are unanswered or not acted upon. In the former case the party
to whom statements hostile to his interest are made may
with much reason be required to contradict, or be held
to acquiesce in their truth. In the latter case he is not
called upon to go to the trouble and expense of writing
a denial, and silence cannot be construed into acquiescence in the truth of the written statements. 5 '
The rule in Missouri is identical, and rests on the proposition
that there is no duty to reply to letters.55 The Montana Supreme
49

229 Mass. 75, 118 N.E. 187 (1918).

50 Ibid.

51 Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Coumbe, 47 Mich. 358, 11 N.W. 196, 199 (1882).
62 Reichel v. Schneider & Brown Lumber Co., 226 Mich. 24, 196 N.W. 614 (1924);
O'Dell v. Goff, 153 Mich. 643, 117 N.W. 59, 61 (1908).
53 135 Mich. 479, 98 N.W. 20 (1904).
54 Id. at 22.
55 St. Joseph Lead Co. v. Fuhrmeister, 353 Mo. 232, 182 S.W.2d 273 (1944). In that
case, defendant sent a registered letter to a corporation's president stating his claim and
requesting certain permission. The letter asked for an early reply. There was no reply
and defendant offered the letter in evidence on the theory of admission by silence.
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Court has likewise declared that letters need not be answered.5"
57
A similar rule is in force in Nebraska.

In New Jersey, the same rule above-mentioned is in force. In
one case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey declared:
oral declarations made to one sought to
by may in some cases be considered
silence, but the rule is otherwise as to
pient is not called upon to reply, or be

be charged thereas admitted by
letters. The reciconsidered as ad-

mitting what is written ... (citing cases, including New

York). An unanswered letter, not received in the course
of a correspondence, is not evidence at all against the recipient.

5

One of the best explanations for the rule against admission by
silence of written matter comes from the Supreme Court of North
Carolina. In Boney v. Boney,5 9 evidence was offered that a party
remained silent when shown statements in letters adverse to his
interest in the presence of witnesses. The court held this not to be
an admission by silence although the force of showing someone a
letter would almost amount to an oral declaration. The court gave
its reasoning as follows:
In 2 Chamberlayne, Mod. Evi . . . the author notes a

distinction between oral and written accusations...
Experience shows that, in the case of the average man, a
marked distinction exists between the readiness with
The court held, at p. 280: "The evidence was properly excluded as hearsay and incompetent. [case] No duty rested upon National's president to reply to the letter and
request, and silence in view of the content of the letter and surrounding circumstances
was not an implied admission that defendant had talked to National's agents or that
National acquiesced in what the agents had stated."
56 Whorley v. Patton-Kjose Co., 90 Mont. 461, 5 P.2d 210, 217 (1931) ("the mere
fact that a person received a letter containing false statements of fact does not impose
upon him an obligation to reply or to protest the falsity of the statement, and the
omission to answer such a letter has no probative value as tending to show an
admission of the matters stated").
57 Kane v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 90 Nebr. 112, 132 N.W. 920 (1911), holding that
failure to reply to a letter is inadmissible.
58 State (Hand) v. Howell, 61 N.J.L. 142, 38 Ati. 748, 749 (Sup. Ct., 1897) aff'd
61 N.J.L. 694, 43 Atd. 1098 (E & A, 1898). See also Garnick v. Gerewitch, 39 N.J. Super.
486, 121 A.2d 423, 427 (1956) ("The failure of the recipients of the letters to reply
thereto cannot be taken as an acquiescence in plaintiff's construction of the restrictive
covenant. . . . There was no duty upon them to reply. Their silence is not admissible
as evidence of an admission of the accuracy of plaintiff's statement.")
59 161 N.C. 614, 77 S.E. 784 (1915).
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which he will reply to an oral question and his readiness
to answer in writing a written claim or demand. Those
who are addressed directly, face to face, feel a spontaneous impulse frequently, perhaps the result of habit, to
deny a false declaration regarding a matter which intimately concerns them. In proportion as yielding to such
an impulse would be natural, failure to do so is significant. No such intuitive suggestion is, as a rule, presented
where statements are made in writing. Even where the
initial impulse is to reply, the feeling frequently fails to
persist until it becomes effective in a resultant denial.
Delay removes spontaneity. A stage of deliberation intervenes. No immediate necessity for taking a definite
position may be felt. In view of these and similar considerations, it can scarcely be said that any uniform natural impulse to traverse erroneous written statements
exists under ordinary circumstances. 60
A decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals shows that this
state is in line with the general rule.61 Oregon has also held that
"the mere fact that letters were received and remained unanswered has no tendency to show an acquiescence of the party in
' 62
the facts stated in them.
Over a century ago, a Pennsylvania court held that "letters
not having been answered, were not evidence at all against the
defendant.1 63 This rule has been uniformly adhered to in that
state." Thus, in one leading case, the court said:
60 Id. at 787.
61 Aftel v. Cound, 32 Ohio App. 270, 167 N.E. 402, 403 (1928) ("We think the rule
is well settled that a person is not required to enter into correspondence with another
in reference to a matter in dispute between them, and that silence should not be
regarded as an admission against the party to whom a letter is addressed. In this
respect the law is different as to oral declarations made by one party to another, which
are of such a nature as to require an answer.')
62 Wakefield, Fries & Co. v. Sherman Clay Co., 141 Ore. 270, 17 P.2d 319, 321-2
(1932). The court also declared "In . . .Learned v. Tillotson, 97 N.Y. 1 . . . the rule is
stated as follows . . . failure to answer a letter is entirely different . . . [and no] silence
should be regarded as an admission against the party to whom the letter is addressed."
See also Kitzke v. Turnidge, 209 Ore. 563, 307 P.2d 522, 526 (1957) to the same effect.
63 Allen v. Peters, 4 Phila. 78, 81 (1860).
64 Dempsey v. Dobson, 174 Pa. 122, 34 Atl. 459 (1896). In Barrow v. Newton, 55 Pa.
Super. 387, 391-2 (1913) it was held: "The letters . . . were properly excluded . . . the
defendant did not answer them and he was in this case under no duty to answer them
. . . and there being no duty upon the defendant to reply, it cannot be said that his
failure to do so was an admission of the truth of the statements in the letters contained."
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Certainly the law applicable to oral incriminating statements does not apply to letters received by a defendant.
One would be likely to ignore such a letter, if false in
its statements of fact or unsound in its advice, as unworthy of serious consideration. Accordingly, in the absence of proof that a defendant replied to letters received
by him or otherwise recognized the validity of the statements contained in them or acted in pursuance of them,
65
the letters are not evidence against him.
The rule against admission by silence prevails in South Caroand appears to be the Texas law as well.6 1 And the Supreme Court of Vermont, in concurring in this rule, gave its
reasoning as follows:
lina, 66

Almost all men will reply to and deny or correct a false
statement verbally made to them. It is done on the spot
and from the first impulse. But when a letter is received
making the same statement, the feeling which readily
prompts the verbal denial not infrequently cools before
the time and opportunity arrive for writing a letter.
Other matters intervene. A want of facility in writing,
or an aversion to correspondence, or habits of dilatoriness may be the real cause of the silence. As the omission
to reply to letters may be explained by so many causes
not applicable to silence when the parties are in personal
conversation, we do not think the same weight should
be attached to it as evidence.6 8
IV.

NEW YORK RULE

Special attention to the New York rule against admission
by silence of written matter is warranted because it is one of the
most exclusionary rules in the country. In no other state is the
rule more rigid or firmly established.
In one of the earliest decisions in the United States on
failure to reply to written matter, the New York Supreme Court,
Commonwealth v. Fusci, 153 Pa. Super. 617, 35 A.2d 93, 96 (1943).
66 Mitchell v. Cleveland, 76 S.C. 432, 57 S.E. 33, 38 (1907).
67 Houston, T. C. Ry. Co. v. Fox, 106 Tex. 317, 166 S.W. 693, 696 (1914).
68 Fenno v. Weston, 31 Vt. 345, 352 (1858).
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in Starkweather v. Converse,6 9 held that "no man, by doing wrong,
can make it the duty of another to complain of the injury at the
peril of being concluded by his silence."7 ° More recently, in
Gray v. Kaufman Dairy,7 the New York Court of Appeals held
as follows:
But it is clear, both upon principle and authority, that
we have no right to indulge in the assumption that the
letters above referred to have the force and effect of
verbal statements made in the presence of the defendant's
officers. The rule is precisely to the contrary. It is well
expressed in Learned v. Tillotson, 97 N.Y. 12 as follows:
"We think that a distinction exists between the effect to
be given to oral declarations made by one party to another, which are in answer to or contradictory of some
statement made by the other party, and a written statement in a letter written by such party to another. It may
well be that under most circumstances what is said to a
man to his face, which conveys the idea of an obligation
upon his part to the person addressing him, or on whose
behalf the statement is made, he is at least in some measure called upon to contradict or explain; but a failure to
answer-a letter is entirely different, and there is no rule
of law which requires a person to enter into a correspondence with another in reference to a matter in dispute between them, or which holds that silence should
be regarded as an admission against the party to whom
the letter is addressed. Such a rule would enable one
party to obtain an advantage over another and has no
72
sanction in the law."
In another leading case, Viele v. McLean,73 the New York Court
of Appeals added the following:
The theory upon which [the letter] was admitted in evidence seems to be that the defendant's failure, upon the
69 17 Wend. 20 (N.Y., 1837).
Id. at 24-5.
71 162 N.Y. 388, 56 N.E. 903 (1900).
72 Id. at 905-6. To the same effect see Bums v. Blidberg Rothchild Co., 195 Misc.
625, 91 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1949).
73 200 N.Y. 260, 93 N.E. 468 (1910).
70
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receipt of the statement, to deny its truth was in the nature of an admission. It is well-settled that this is an
erroneous view of the law. "While a party may be called
upon in many cases to speak where charges are made
against him, and in failing to do so may be considered
as acquiescing in its correctness, his omission to answer
a written allegation, whether by affidavits or otherwise,
cannot be regarded as an admission of the correctness
thereof, and that it is true in all respects. Reasons may
exist why he may choose and has a right to remain silent,
and to vindicate himself at some future period and on
some more opportune occasions." (citing cases) "One
to whom a letter is written may remain silent

. . .

and

in such cases silence does not operate as an admission
of the matters to which the letter relates." (cases) 74
In a relatively recent case, the Appellate Division, First Department had before it a strong case for admission of a letter.
Here the party sought to be charged with the letter had been
shown the letter and had an oral chance to rebut its contents
but had not done so. Nevertheless, the Court held that the letter
was inadmissible, saying:
The letter was received in evidence on the theory that
the contents had been admitted by the defendant's failure to make a statement in relation to its contents when
it was originally shown to him shortly after the death of
the plaintiff's wife. In the first place, defendant was not
asked to make a statement in respect to the letter. In
the second place, had he been asked, he was under no
5
duty to make any statement.7
V.

THE FEDERAL RULE UNDER THE

NEW

FEDERAL RULES OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Under Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the federal courts are not strictly enjoined to follow state rules
of evidence, but rather may be more liberal and admit evidence
74 Id. at 469. In accord with this case see Droste v. Wabash R. Co., 153 App. Div.
160, 138 N.Y.S. 203 (1st Dept., 1912).
75 Travers v. Lawlor, 245 App. Div. 32, 280 N.Y.S. 575, 576 (1st Dept., 1935).
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admissible under any federal statute or under rules of evidence
heretofore applied in equity cases heard in the federal courts.
In a recent decision, it was held that a federal court hearing a
non-equity case might look to non-equity federal precedents to
determine whether evidence was admissible, even though the
state rule called for exclusion.76 Accordingly, complete examination of this subject requires an attempt to ascertain the federal
77
rule notwithstanding the application of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkin
to the local federal district courts.
The earliest federal case on point comes from the District
of Columbia, and holds that failure to reply to letters does not
admit the facts therein. 78 The next case of importance was decided by Judge Taft, later President of the United States and
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Speaking for
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Judge Taft
declared:
The rule is well-settled that conversations between parties to a controversy, in which one makes a statement of
fact of which both have personal knowledge, and which
naturally calls for a denial by the other if the statement is
untrue, are competent against the silent party, as admissions, by acquiescence, of the truth of the statement. ...
With respect to written communications, however, the
rule is different, because the failure of one receiving a
letter to answer it may be attributed to many causes besides an acquiescence in the truth of what is written, and
such a rule would furnish a dangerous weapon in the
hand of an unscrupulous party to make evidence in his
favor against a careless opponent.

.

.

. The better-

supported rule, probably is that unanswered letters are
ordinarily not evidence against the person addressed, as
admissions of the truth of statements contained therein.
Learned v. Tillotson, 97 N.Y. 8; Talcott v. Harris, 93
N.Y. 567, 571 (other cases).79
76 Hope v. Hearst Consolidated Publications, Inc., 294 F.2d 681, 688 (2d Cir., 1961).
77 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
78 Meguire v. Corwine, 10 D.C. Rep. (3 MacArthur) 81, 84, 90 (1879).

79 Morris v. Norton, 75 Fed. 912, 924 (6th Cir., 1896).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

The foregoing case was a civil case, but it was very shortly
followed thereafter by a leading criminal case from the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which held as follows:
It is also urged that the letter was admissible as a tacit
admission by the accused of the truth of its statements,
it having been proved that the accused did not reply
to it. Admissions, of course, may be inferred from silence
as well as from express statements, but it has been uniformly held by the courts that the failure to reply to a
letter is not to be treated in a criminal or in a civil
action as an admission of the contents of the letter. In
Coin v. Eastman, 1 Cush. 215, the court said:
.."Letters addressed to an individual, and received
by him, are not to have the same effect as verbal communications. Silence in the latter case may authorize the inference of an assent to the statement made, but not
equally so in the case of a letter received, but never answered or acted upon." . . .
In People v. Green, 1 Parker Cr. R. 17, the court
said: "The maxim, 'Qui tacet consentire videtur,' . ..
could not, in principle, be applicable to facts stated in
a letter which the party was not bound or interested to
answer. It would be placing a man entirely at the mercy
of another if he was bound by what others chose to assert
in addressing letters to him. In no case could his silence
be considered an admission of such facts."
...The same principle has been repeatedly applied
in civil actions .... Learned v. Tillotson, 97 N.Y. 1; Bank
v. Delafield, 126 N.Y. 418, 27 N.E. 797; Gray v. Ice
Cream Co., 162 N.Y. 397, 56 N.E. 903.s
Several years later, the Ninth Circuit took a similar view.
In Poy Con Tom v. United States,"' the court declared that "it
has been uniformly held by the courts that the failure to reply
to a letter is not to be treated in a criminal or civil action as an
'8 2
admission of the contents of the letter.
80 Packer v. United States, 106 Fed. 906, 910 (2d. Cir., 1901).
81 7 F.2d 109 (9th Cir., 1925).
82 Id. at 110.
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In 1927, the United States Supreme Court had occasion to
deal with this problem. Citing many prior decisions, such as
Packer v. United States and Viele v. McLean with approval, Mr.
Justice Holmes declared for a unanimous court:
A man cannot make evidence for himself by writing a
letter containing the statements that he wishes to prove.
He does not make the letter evidence by sending it to the
party against whom he wishes to prove the facts. He no
more can impose a duty to answer a charge than he can
impose a duty to pay by sending goods. Therefore, a
failure to answer such adverse assertions in the absence of
further circumstances... has no effect as an admission.8 3
Thus, the pre-Federal Rules decisions strongly favored exclusion
of written matter not answered by the party sought to be charged
with the admission.
The number of decisions subsequent to 1938 is not large
enough to say that the past rule is accepted as still binding in all
federal courts, but such few decisions as there are indicate that
Rule 43(a) will make no change in this area. For example, in
one case in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, an ex-employee sued an employer for wrongful discharge,
and moved for summary judgment. In opposition to this, the
employer presented its officer's affidavit wherein the officer swore
that he and the employee had made an oral agreement cancelling
the employment contract. In his reply affidavit, the employee
stated that even if the officer's version were true the alleged agreement of cancellation was legally invalid. On trial, the affidavits
were offered into evidence on the theory that the employee's
failure squarely to contradict the officer was a virtual admission
of the making of the recission agreement, but this evidence was
excluded. The appellate court upheld the exclusion, citing an
old New York case dealing with admission by silence of written
matter.8 4 And a federal district court in Pennsylvania has reached
the same result.8 5
88 Leach & Co. v. Pierson, 275 U.S. 120, 128 (1927).

Sanders v. Schenley Products Co., 108 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir., 1939).
Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Davis Mfg. Co., 149 F. Supp. 852, 855 (E.D. Pa.,
1957) ("I do not agree that the defendants' failure to answer the plaintiff's opposition
84
85
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VI.

LAW REVIEW

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

The number of cases dealing with admission of facts set forth
in newspaper articles by failing to protest them is very small. In
all probability, the reason why so few cases have arisen is the
widespread recognition that a person is not responsible for what
others say about him without his consent, and that any statement
in an article is merely printed hearsay and is not admissible unless
adopted by the person sought to be charged.8 6
The mere fact that a person is aware of an article about him
and fails to deny statements made therein does not constitute an
admission that the statements are accurate. A leading case on
point comes from the New York Court of Appeals. In People v.
Smith,87 that court declared:
The declarations of a party that he had heard or read
certain statements cannot be given in evidence to establish such statements, because they are at most hearsay,
and when stated by him as such it does not change their
nature, but they continue to be hearsay and are, consequently, inadmissible. All the defendant said as to the
newspaper account was that it contained a statement to
the effect that the witness had said that the decedent
declared that the defendant did it. This was not an admission that he did it, or of the truth of any of the
matters there stated.s8

In LouisianaPurchaseExposition Co. v. Emerson, 9 the plaintiff sought to use as evidence of the making of a subscription for
when they attempted to register their mark amounts to an admission in a suit against
them for infringement that the marks are confusingly similar.")
86 See, for example, Collins v. State, 75 Tex. Cri. R. 534, 171 S.W. 729, 731 (1914),
where the court held: "If Ira W. Collins authorized the publication, it would be
admissible against him, but until that was shown in some way the mere fact that the
A. T. Still Osteopathic Infirmary published his name with it would not make Collins
responsible." And see Norwood v. United States, 45 F.2d 495, 496 (8th Cir., 1930) holding
that the introduction of a telephone directory listing to show defendant's connection
with another in operating a certain place was error, in the absence of a showing of
defendant's knowledge that he was going to be listed in this way.
87 172 N.Y. 210, 64 N.E. 814 (1902).
88 Id. at 236.
89 149 Mo. App. 594, 129 S.W. 753 (1910).
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stock the fact that defendant had failed to deny an article in a
newspaper which had stated that the defendant was a large purchaser of stock in the plaintiff exposition. The Missouri Court of
Appeals rejected this evidence as inadmissible, and held that there
was no admission of the facts stated in the article by failure of
the defendant to deny them. It said:
it is said the newspaper article was competent evidence
because it tended to prove defendant had ratified the
subscription for $2,500 worth of stock if he did not make
it in the first place, and tended further to prove he had
made it. This argument proceeds on the theory that,
as defendant read the article in the Banner which said
he subscribed for $2,500 worth of stock and did not deny
or repudiate the statement, the article was relevant evidence to prove he had subscribed for stock or had assented to a subscription in his name to the amount mentioned. We reject this contention and hold the article
was incompetent. It was not competent unless the exposition company could have made out a case against
defendant for the price of the stock merely because he
did not repudiate a newspaper article which said he had
subscribed. A contract of subscription between the exposition company and defendant would have to be established to make him liable; and certainly the exposition
company could claim no such contract from the bare fact
that a newspaper had so stated and defendant had not
denied the statement .... It is manifest those cases lend
no support to the proposition that a man will become
liable as a subscriber for corporate stock if some newspaper represents he has subscribed and he does not come
forward in denial of the statement. 90
Probably the most striking case holding in favor
is Spencer v. Read.9 1 Here the party sought to be
actually asked about the article. Indeed, this case
situation analogous to admission by silence of an
90 Id. at 754.

91 217 Fed. 508 (8th Cir. 1914).

of exclusion
charged was
verges on a
oral charge.
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Nevertheless, the article was excluded. In upholding this ruling,
the United States Circuit Court for the Eighth Circuit declared:
Complaint is next made of the exclusion of an article
published in the Morris Herald of August 11, 1911....
There was offered in evidence by plaintiff a clipping
from this issue of the newspaper mentioned, entitled
"Get Rich Quick Deal, Marseilles People Stung by High
Finance, Swanson Deal." This clipping is an attempt at
"a humorous write-up" of what purports to be the efforts
of citizens of Marseilles to secure the location at that
place of the Swanson Manufacturing Company in lieu
of some manufacturing plant recently removed from
Marseilles to Moline, Ill., and the subsequent bankruptcy
of the Swanson concern, and the resulting loss to the
Marseilles citizens. A witness testified that he had a copy
of this paper of August 11th at his place of business in
Shenandoah some time in the fall of 1911, and, as the
defendant Mitchell was passing one day, called to him
and said, "I did not know you were such a scoundrel or
bad man as this," and showed him the article; that
Mitchell read it aloud in his presence and the presence
of some others and laughed and said, "That is about the
way we got the money. . . ." He did not deny in my
presence any of these statements in the transactions ....

Nor is it admissible against Mitchell, for one is not called
upon to deny the truth of matters appearing in the public
press concerning him, to which his attention may be
called, under the circumstances shown in this case, to
avoid personal responsibility for such matters. There is
92
no merit in this assignment of error.

From these authorities, it can hardly be doubted that newspaper articles of any kind are inadmissible against the persons to
whom they refer unless such person expressly admits the truth
of the matter set forth in them. A failure to deny the statements,
even in discussing the article, is insufficient to constitute an admission of the correctness thereof. No statement at all is even less
of a foundation on which to lay the basis for an admission.
92 Id. at 517.
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VII.

KEEPING WRITTEN OR PRINTED MATTER

Printed Matter

Although it has been shown above that the mere failure to
rebut written or printed statements is not an admission against
the party mentioned therein, a further question arises as to
whether this rule is altered by the fact that the party sought to
be charged with the admission kept the written or printed matter
in his possession for whatever personal use he decided to make
of it.
The rule is well-settled that as to printed matter at least,
the mere retention of the material does not show agreement with
or admission of the truth of the matter involved. In Herndon v.
Lowry,"3 the United States Supreme Court declared, in a constitutional law case, that "no inference can be drawn from the possession of the books mentioned, either that they embodied the
doctrines of the Communist Party or that they represented views
advocated by the appellant. ' 9 4 Likewise, in Shaw v. State,9 5 an
Oklahoma court declared:
The contention of the defendant that the books,
pamphlets, and other written material admitted in evidence over objection of defendant and purportedly showing the doctrines advocated by the Communist Party
without some evidence to authenticate these various exhibits and to show that the statements therein made were
in truth and fact statements representing the true position of the Communist Party is so fundamentally sound
that this court has been unable to find any legal authority to sustain the admission of this evidence."'
A very strong case in favor of exclusion is Commonwealth v.
Jaunes.97 Here, the defendant was prosecuted for arson. The
prosecution introduced into evidence testimony that on the evening after the fire the defendant voluntarily exhibited a maga93 301 U.S. 242 (1937).

Id. at 249.
76 Okla. Cri. 271, 134 P.2d 999 (1943).
96 Id. at 1012. In accord with this case, see Wood v. State, 76 Okla. Cri. 89, 134
P.2d 1021 (1943); Jaffee v. State, 76 Okla. Cri. 95, 134 P.2d 1027 (1943).
97 139 Pa. Super. 118, 11 A.2d 790 (1940).
94
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zine to an officer which he had been reading and called the officer's
attention to an article entitled "How to Catch Fire Bugs." The
appellate court held that the admission of this article and testimony surrounding it was reversible error. It said:
The conduct of the defendant, in handing the current
number of the magazine article to the witness and declaring that he was just reading an article about fire bugs,
cannot be construed into an admission from defendant
of any participation in the crime on his part .... The
testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial, failing to connect defendant in any way with the commission of the
crime.
The court below did not restrict the admissibility
of the evidence to defendant's declaration, but admitted
the contents of the article, and indeed, the entire magazine into evidence. This action was, we believe, prejudicial error. Not only were the contents of this article
printed declarations of a third party, not himself a witness, but the article contained nothing to connect the defendant with participation in the setting of the fire. The
admissibility of the article itself into evidence violates
the hearsay rule; the contents are irrelevant to the issues,
and grossly prejudicial to defendant.98
Unanswered Letters
Although authority is not abundant, such authority as there
is supports the position that the mere retention of unanswered
letters is not an admission of the truth of the statements therein.
Thus, in an early New York case, the court declared that "The
opinion seems now to be established .. .that the possession of
unanswered letters is not, of itself, evidence of the contents."99 In
a California case, letters addressed by one secret society to another,
directing the latter to inform the defendant that friends of one
whom the defendant has killed and the police were after him, in
order that defendant might change his residence to avoid detection, and which were found in defendant's possession at the time
98 Id. at 793.

99 People v. Green, 1 Parker's Cri. Rep. 11, 18 (N.Y., 1845).
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of his arrest, were held to be inadmissible on his trial for murder."'
And a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit declared:
The letters, however, if properly identified, would
not of themselves authorize any inference against the
defendants. They were only the acts and declarations of
others; and, unless adopted or sanctioned by the defendants, by some reply or statement, or by some act done in
pursuance of their suggestions, they ought not to preju10
dice the defendants.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis shows clearly that neither a letter nor
any other writing or publication constitutes an admission merely
because the person to whom it is addressed or who is described
therein, fails to reply or rebut the statements.
To require individuals to reply to all correspondence directed
to them would constitute an intolerable imposition. A busy person, and especially one occupying a public or semi-public position,
gets dozens of letters from cranks, or apparent cranks, and others
with whom he wishes to avoid dealing. Such letters often contain
accusations or charges of various kinds. Were the recipient of
the letter compelled to enter into correspondence with the writer,
the latter's goal of annoyance might well be fulfilled by compulsion of law. Surely no rational legal system would tolerate such a
situation.
Even where the letter contains what purports to be helpful
information, such as acknowledgment of receipt of some item allegedly sent by the addressee, no duty to respond is raised. The
recipient may well rely on the letter-writer to determine his own
mistakes, and may assume that such error will be corrected in due
course by other means, such as correspondence from the actual
sender. People are not required to be drawn into the affairs of
others by the errors of the latter, or of some third party. While
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held that "a letter found upon the prisoner when arrested has been held to be no
evidence of the facts stated in it."
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answering all letters of inquiry may be polite, an omission of the
best etiquette is not enough to raise a legal admission.
There is even less to be said for requiring people to read
every word in the newspapers, magazines, or other periodicals and
protest statements about them. A repetition of the prior statement, even in a correction, may be more damaging than the original publication. The subject of an article may feel that the circulation of the periodical is too small to be bothered, or that its
reputation is too poor for people to believe it, or that his reputation is so good that no one will believe the story, or for other
reasons may take no action. To impose a duty to correct every
word said about someone in print, would, at least in the case of
public figures, leave little time for any other activity. The only
safe rule, which enjoys widespread judicial support, is to exclude
such fact, and leave the proponent to prove his case by reliable
and significant evidence.

